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Abstract This study examines the regularity properties ensuring that individual
expenditure functions are legitimate individual cost functions in the context of collec-
tive household models. The structure of collective household models entails a scaling
of income through a function that describes how resources are sharedwithin the house-
hold. This modified income function defines expenditure functions at the individual
level. Our study completes previous work on modifying functions by Barten, Gor-
man, and Lewbel that was limited to the investigation of the scaling of prices and the
translation of income without considering the scaling of incomes. We find that the
product of the modifying function and the household expenditure function maintains
the regularity properties of expenditure functions if the modifying function is posi-
tive, homogeneous of degree zero and at least quasi-concave. We also examine how
changes in prices affect the curvature of the modified income function and, in turn,
inequality in the distribution of resources within the household. An example shows
how our results can be used to test the curvature properties of individual expenditure
functions as well as to measure the inequality within the household.
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1 Introduction
For long time the behavior of multi-person households has been described within the
fiction of a unitary utility function, although neoclassical theory of demand explains
constrained optimal choices of individuals. The unitary approach has been exten-
sively applied in theoretical and empirical works because it allows testing restrictions
on household behavior. However, a number of empirical evidences find that the unitary
model fails in representing the behavior of multi-person households and, moreover, is
unable to measure the welfare of individuals. The collective approach (Apps and Rees
1988, 1997; Blundell et al. 2007; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Chiappori 1988;
Donni 2003; Donni and Chiappori 2011; Lundberg and Pollak 1996) allows the iden-
tification of the sharing rule governing the intra-household allocation of resources and
the recovery of individual preferences and welfare functions. The structure of collec-
tive models entails a modification of income, or non-labor income in a labor supply
context, through a function that scales income describing how resources are shared
within the household. This modified income function is in general expressed in terms
of individual levels of income and defines expenditure functions at the individual level.
This study examines the regularity properties ensuring that individual expenditure
functions (Browning et al. 2014; Chiappori et al. 2002; Dunbar et al. 2013; Menon
and Perali 2012) are plausible individual cost functions within the collective context.
We extend the results of Lewbel to the non-differentiable case using relatively simpler
proofs. Unlike Lewbel’s (1985) seminal work, which focused mainly on a price trans-
formation à la Barten (1964) and an income translation à la Gorman (1976), we study
the transformation of income with a scaling function as traditionally adopted in the
collective theory.We find that the product of themodifying function and the household
expenditure function maintains the regularity properties of expenditure functions if
the modifying function is positive, homogeneous of degree zero and at least quasi-
concave. We also examine the curvature properties of the income scaling function
to introduce new measures of inequality (Peluso and Trannoy 2007) describing how
differently each member of the household responds to price changes. An example of
modified individual expenditure functions that shows the relevance of our results for
testing the curvature properties of individual expenditure functions as well as for the
measurement of inequality within the household is also presented.
Preliminaries Lewbel (1985) describes within a unitary framework the properties of
the following general transformation of the household cost function that maintains
integrability of a demand system
e(p, u, d) = f [e∗(h(p, d), u), p, d], (1)
where p is an  vector of prices, d a vector of demographic variables and e∗(h(p, d), u)
is a legitimate cost function corresponding to the minimum expenditure necessary to
attain utility level u at scaled prices p∗ = h(p, d). The transformation functions f
and h are continuous and twice differentiable. The f function describes interactions
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of d with e∗, while both the f and h modifying functions allow interactions of d
with p in an almost unlimited variety of interesting forms. Modifying functions can
be interpreted as household technologies. They generate demographically varying
intermediate goods where p∗ is the shadow price vector of the intermediate goods.
Before the introduction of the collective household theory by Chiappori (1988),
the literature on modifying functions of demand systems focused mainly on a gen-
eral transformation encompassing both demographic scaling of prices (Barten 1964)
given by hi (p, d) = p∗i = pi si (d) for the i th good and demographic translating of
expenditure (Gorman 1976) f (p, u, d) = e∗ (h(p, d), u) + P(p, d), where P(p, d)
represents fixed overheads for necessary quantities (Pollak and Wales 1981; Lewbel
1985; Perali 2008). Lewbel’s contribution (1985) mainly focuses on a price scaling
transformation h à la Barten and an income translation f à la Gorman within the uni-
tary context.We complete his seminalwork by studying the properties of the individual
expenditure function obtained from the transformation of income with a scaling func-
tion.1 The extension of our interest is, therefore, the scaling of expenditure through
the function m(p, d)
f (p, u, d) = e∗(p, u, d)m(p, d), (2)
which has been used in empirical work to identify the rule governing the intra-
household allocation of resources (Dunbar et al. 2013; Lewbel and Pendakur 2008;
Menon and Perali 2012). Further, while Lewbel (1985) examines the restrictions of
the modifying functions h and f , we are interested in analyzing the properties of m
guaranteeing that the product e∗ (p, u, d) m(p, d) maintains the properties of f .
From unitary to collective models Our interest in the scaling function m(p, d) is
motivated by its importance in the context of the collective theory. Interestingly, the
collective approach shares intriguing similarities with the theory of modifying func-
tions. Two-stage budgeting is a special case of modifying functions where in the first
stage allocation on an aggregate good is observed and then the unobserved second
stage allocation on intermediate goods is deduced using demographic information.
In a collective context, the difference is in the second stage where the budget is not
allocated among unobserved intermediate goods, but rather among observable goods
assignable to specific household members. The observed second stage is then used
to identify how the household budget is allocated among the K household members
e(p, u, d) = e1(p, u1, d) + · · · + eK (p, uK , d), where ek(p, uk, d) is the individual
expenditure function2 and u = (u1, . . . , uK ) with uk being the utility level of individ-
ual k. Then, each member separately chooses her/his unobserved consumption subject
1 The scaling modification of expenditure has been introduced by Lewbel (1985, Theorem 8), more for
mathematical completeness rather than for its economic relevance in the unitary household context. Lewbel
defines the function β(d) that scales the cost function e∗, but, unlike the present analysis, the function β(d)
does not depend on prices and is assumed to be β(d) = 1, neglecting to signal that the product of functions
may generate undesirable characteristics of f .
2 We call ek individual expenditure and is also known as sharing rule in the collective literature, often
denoted by φk .
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to the corresponding individual budget constraint
max
ck
{Uk(ck, d)|ek = pT ck = e∗k (p, uk, d) m(p, d)}. (3)
We thus define the fk transformation in this way
ek(p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d), p, d] = e∗k (p, uk, d)m(p, d), (4)
wherem(p, d) is the income scaling function. For example, suppose that the household
budget e(p, u, d) of a family composed by a couple and one child is entirely spent
to buy food c f at price p f and clothing ck for adults and children at prices pck
with k = a, c. Following Dunbar et al. (2013) and Menon and Perali (2012), this
information is sufficient to derive a resource share as ηk = ak(p f c f )+pck cky , where
ak is a known measure of publicness of good f with 0 ≤ ak ≤ 1.3 The individual-
specific resource share ηk is used to approximate the partially observed individual
expenditure function e∗k (p, uk, d) that is corrected by the income scaling function
m(p, d) describing how assignable goods are allocated in each household to obtain
the best estimate of ek(p, uk, d).
The regularity properties of individual expenditure functions ek(p, uk, d) and the
income scaling function m(p, d) have not been characterized yet, though estimates of
the sharing rule are extensively used in the empirical literature. This characterization
is of general interest because it extends microeconomics theory to host the fact that the
relevant decision unit is the individual. The assumption that household and individual
behavior is the same introduces a significant aggregation bias. As stressed in Browning
et al. (2013:3) “what is relevant is not the “preferences” of a given household, but rather
the preferences of the individuals that compose it.” Browning and Chiappori (1998)
study ageneral collectivemodel that includes household public goods and externalities.
Their aim is to test whether household data support the conditions derived by the
unitary and collective model. Our contribution is to study the testable properties that
must be satisfied by individual expenditure functions to be theoretically plausible cost
functions.
We now proceed to Sect. 2 by extending the theory of legitimate cost functions
of Lewbel (1985) to individual expenditure functions. The conditions for individual
expenditure functions to be legitimate functions are derived for specific functional
forms. Section 3 analyzes the curvature properties of the individual expenditure func-
tion describing individual aversion to changes in prices. An example is provided in
Sect. 4. The conclusive section discusses implications of our results lending special
emphasis to the importance of testing the curvature properties of the estimated sharing
rule in empirical studies.
3 When goods are necessities, such as food, the range 0 < ak < 1 does not include the limits.
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2 Modified individual expenditure functions in a collective context
Consider a family of two persons k = 1, 2.4 Each member k privately consumes a
bundle of market goods ck ∈ R+ and faces a vector of prices p ∈ R++. Note that
purchases of individuals may include also leisure time and thus the vector of prices
would include the corresponding wages. In the analysis, we omit the consumption of
public goods or the presence of externalities within families.5 We also abstract from
the consumption of domestically produced goods (Apps and Rees 1997; Chiappori
1997).
The collective model relies on the following assumptions. Firstly, preferences of
each family member over the consumption of ck are represented by an individual
quasi-concave utility function Uk (ck, d) twice differentiable and strictly increasing
in ck , where d ∈ Rn describes observable heterogeneity both at the individual level,
such as age or education of individual k, and at the family level, such as quality of
the living area. Secondly, outcomes of the decision problem are assumed to be Pareto-
efficient. Pareto-efficiency implies that the consumption equilibrium will be on the
Pareto frontier of the family. Further, when all goods are privately consumed and there
are no consumption externalities, these assumptions allow describing family behavior
using a two-stage process: first, the family agrees on a rule to share resources among
its members, then, each member maximizes her individual utility function subject to
her individual share of income.6
In the dual representation of individual consumption choices, each person min-
imizes her share of family resources to achieve a given level of individual utility.
Formally, we define the collective individual expenditure function of member k as
ek (p, uk, d) = min
ck
{pT ck | Uk (ck, d) ≥ uk}, (5)
where ek(p, uk, d) : R++ ×R×Rn → R++ represents the minimum level of expen-
diture needed to individual k to achieve the level of utility uk at given prices p.
Following Lewbel’s (1985) specification of the household transformed expenditure
function e(p, u, d) = f [e∗(h(p, d)u), p, d], we specify the individual expenditure
function ek as follows
ek (p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d], (6)
where e∗k (p, uk, d) is a legitimate cost function if it is: (a) homogeneous of degree 1
in p; (b) positive, strictly increasing in uk and non-decreasing in pi , i = 1, . . . , ;
4 Our results can be straightforwardly extended to larger family units.
5 The inclusion of public goodswould imply the derivation of Lindhal shadow prices described by a specific
transformation as shown in Browning et al. (2013). However, because in this work we concentrate on a
transformation of income rather than prices, we prefer to leave the treatment of public goods aside to avoid
a potential source of confusion. This will be the object of future research.
6 For a complete appraisal of the collective household theory see for instance Browning et al. (2014).
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(c) concave in p; (d) continuous in p and uk .7 We note that the function fk , which
is assumed continuous, allows interaction of demographic variables and prices with
the expenditure function. Our interest is to derive restrictions on fk guaranteeing that
ek is also a theoretically plausible cost function for which properties (a)–(d) hold.
The following, though simple, are useful to verify the properties of the individual
expenditure function in empirical applications.8
Proposition 1 (Homogeneity of degree 1 in p) Let e∗k be a legitimate cost function
and let ek (p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d]. If fk is homogeneous of degree 1 in
(e∗k , p), then ek is homogeneous of degree 1 in p.
Proof Because e∗k is homogeneous of degree 1 in p and fk is homogeneous of degree 1
in (e∗k , p), by definition of homogeneous function we have fk[e∗k (tp, uk, d) , tp, d] =
fk[te∗k (p, uk, d) , tp, d] = t fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d]. unionsq
Proposition 2 (Positive, strictly increasing in uk and non-decreasing in p) Let
ek (p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d], with being a legitimate cost function. If
fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d] > 0, fk strictly increasing in e∗k and non-decreasing in pi ,∀i = 1, . . . , , then ek (p, uk, d) is positive, strictly increasing in uk and non-
decreasing in p.
Proof The condition fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d] > 0 implies that ek > 0. Because
e∗k is a legitimate cost function, it is strictly increasing in uk and non-decreasing
in pi , ∀i = 1, . . . , . The former condition implies that taking two different val-
ues of uk , uk1 < uk2, then e∗k (p, uk1, d) < e∗k (p, uk2, d). Because fk is strictly
increasing in e∗k , we have fk[e∗k (p, uk1, d) , p, d] < fk[e∗k (p, uk2, d) , p, d], i.e.
the strict monotonicity of fk with respect to uk . For two different vectors of prices
p1 = (p11, . . . , p1l ) and p2 = (p21, . . . , p2l ), the monotonicity of e∗k with respect
to pi implies that if p1i < p
2
i , e
∗
k (p
1
i , uk, d) ≤ e∗k (p2i , uk, d), with i = 1, . . . , .
Then, the monotonicity of fk with respect to e∗k implies that fk[e∗k (p1i , uk, d), p, d] ≤
fk[e∗k (p2i , uk, d), p, d], and, finally, from the monotonicity of fk with respect to pi ,
follows that fk[e∗k (p1i , uk, d), p1i , d] ≤ fk[e∗k (p2i , uk, d), p1i , d] ≤ fk[e∗k (p2i , uk, d),
p2i , d], guaranteeing the monotonicity of ek also with respect to pi . unionsq
Proposition 3 (Concavity in p)Let e∗k be a legitimate cost function and ek (p, uk, d) =
fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d]. Assume fk concave in (e∗k , p) and increasing in e∗k . Then
ek (p, uk, d) is concave in p.
Proof For ek (p, uk, d) to be concave in p, it must be that ∀α ∈ [0, 1] and ∀p1, p2 ∈
R++, ek(αp1 + (1− α)p2, uk, d) ≥ αek(p1, uk, d) + (1− α)ek(p2, uk, d). We start
7 The individual expenditure function may depend also on distribution factors that are variables affecting
the household decision process without influencing either individual preferences or the budget constraint.
Distribution factors are helpful in recovering the structure of the collective model and play an important
role in empirical applications (Chiappori and Ekeland 2009; Chiappori et al. 2002; Menon and Perali 2012).
Here, without loss of generality, distribution factors are not explicitly modeled but are considered elements
of the vector of exogenous characteristics d.
8 Unlike Lewbel (1985), these propositions allow for non-differentiable functions.
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from the hypothesis of concavity of e∗k , e∗k (αp1+(1−α)p2, uk, d) ≥ αe∗k (p1, uk, d)+
(1−α)e∗k (p2, uk, d). Then, from the monotonicity of fk we obtain fk[e∗k (αp1 + (1−
α)p2, uk, d), αp1 + (1−α)p2, d] ≥ f [αe∗k (p1, uk, d)+ (1−α)e∗k (p2, uk, d), αp1 +
(1 − α)p2, d] and, because fk is concave in (e∗k , p), then fk[αe∗k (p1, uk, d) +
(1 − α)e∗k (p2, uk, d), αp1 + (1 − α)p2, d] ≥ α fk[e∗k (p1, uk, d), p1, d] + (1 −
α) fk[e∗k (p2, uk, d), p2, d]. unionsq
The above propositions describe the properties that fk must have to guarantee
that the function ek (p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d] is also legitimate for any
legitimate cost function e∗k .
We now complete the characterization of the function fk to include the product
between a legitimate cost function and an income scaling function that depends on
prices and exogenous factors. The modifying function fk describing how prices and
demographic factors interact with e∗k (p, uk, d) is as follows
ek (p, uk, d) = fk[e∗k (p, uk, d) , p, d] (7)
= e∗k (p, uk, d) m(p, d) with 0 < m(p, d) <
e
e∗k
,
where e∗k (p, uk, d) is a legitimate individual cost function and e (p, u, d) is the cost
function at the household level.9 Note that the function fk corrects an individual
income e∗k (p, uk, d) measured with error according to the index 0 < m(p, d) <
e
e∗k
that may correct towards the bottom or the top depending on whether m(p, d) ≶ 1.
Wenow investigate the properties of the scaling functionm(p, d)needed to preserve
a regular and theoretically plausible ek (p, uk, d).
Proposition 4 (Homogeneity of degree 0 in p) If the scaling function m(p, d) is
homogeneous of degree zero in p and e∗k (p, uk, d) is a legitimate cost function, then
ek(p, uk, d) = e∗k (p, uk, d)m(p, d) is homogeneous of degree 1 in p.
Proof By the definition of homogeneity ek(tp, uk, d) = e∗k (tp, uk, d)m(tp, d) =
te∗k (p, uk, d)tαm(p, d) = tα+1e∗k (p, uk, d)m(p, d) = tα+1ek(p, uk, d), thus ek is
homogeneous of degree 1 in p if and only if m(p, d) is homogeneous of degree 0 in
p. unionsq
Proposition 5 (Positive and non-decreasing in pi ) Let ek(p, uk, d) = e∗k (p, uk, d)
m(p, d). If m(p, d) is positive and e∗k (p, uk, d) is a legitimate cost function, then
ek(p, uk, d) is positive and strictly increasing in uk. If m(p, d) is non-decreasing in
pi , ∀i = 1, . . . , , then ek(p, uk, d) is also non-decreasing in pi ,∀i = 1, . . . , .
Proof The positivity of ek(p, uk, d) follows from the definition. Then, taking
two different values of uk with uk1 < uk2, we have e∗k (p, uk1, d)m(p, d) <
e∗k (p, uk2, d)m(p, d), because e∗k is a cost function and m(p, d) is positive,
9 A similar scaling transformation of a plausible cost function is described in Lewbel (1985), Theorem 8.
This specification is adopted in Dunbar et al. (2013), Menon and Perali (2012) and Menon et al. (2012) to
estimate the sharing rule.
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ek(p, uk, d) is increasing in uk . Further, taking two different vectors of prices p1 =
(p11, . . . , p
1
l ) and p
2 = (p21, . . . , p2l ), with p1i ≤ p2i , we have e∗k (p1i , uk, d)m(p1i , d)
≤ e∗k (p2i , uk2, d)m(p2i , d), because both e∗k (p, uk, d) and m(p, d) are non-decreasing
in pi ,∀i = 1, . . . , . unionsq
If ek is non-decreasing in pi , ∀i = 1, . . . , , and we suppose that e∗k (p, uk, d) and
m(p, d) are differentiable with respect to pi ,∀i = 1, . . . , , then
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂ek (pk ,uk ,d)
∂p1
= ∂e∗k
∂p1
(p, uk, d)m(p, d) + e∗k (p, uk, d) ∂m∂p1 (p, d) ≥ 0,
...
∂ek (pk ,uk ,d)
∂p
= ∂e∗k
∂p
(p, uk, d)m(p, d) + e∗k (p, uk, d) ∂m∂p (p, d) ≥ 0.
(8)
This result follows from the assumptions on m(p, d) and recalling that e∗k (p, uk, d)
is a legitimate cost function.
Remark 1 Note that if ∂m
∂pi
≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . , , then the  inequalities of system (8)
are satisfied, but Proposition 5 gives only a sufficient condition. Therefore, the system
is satisfied even if
∂e∗k
∂pi
1
e∗k
≥ − ∂m
∂pi
1
m
. (9)
Multiplying each side of this equation by pi , we obtain
∂e∗k
∂pi
pi
e∗k
≥ − ∂m
∂pi
pi
m
, (10)
describing the relationship between the elasticity of the expenditure e∗k (p, uk, d) and
the elasticity of the scaling function m(p, d) with respect to the i th price.
Remark 2 (Continuity) To maintain property (d) of ek(p, uk, d), m(p, d) has to be
continuous with respect to p.
The concavity requirement for the expenditure function ek(p, uk, d) is as follows.
Propositions 6–8 together correspond to Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 (Corollary 5.18 of Avriel et al. 1988) Let e∗k : X ⊆ Rs → R and
m : X ⊆ Rs → R be non-negative and concave functions. Then, the function ek(x) =
e∗k (x)m(x) is semi-strictly quasi-concave on X, with respect to x.
Observe that we need the same domain for the functions e∗k and m(p, d). This
implies that to verify concavity these functions are supposed to vary only in prices.
Proposition 7 (Proposition 3.30 of Avriel et al. 1988) If ek : X ⊆ Rs → R is an
upper semicontinuous semi-strictly quasi-concave function, defined on a convex set
X, then it is also quasi-concave.
Further, the following result holds (Theorem 21.15 of Simon and Blume 1994).
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Proposition 8 Suppose that ek : X ⊂ Rs → R be positive and X is a convex cone. If
ek is homogeneous of degree one and quasi-concave on X, then it is concave on X.
Our results have important implications both for providing testable hypotheses
about the curvature of the sharing rule that are not usually tested in the empirical
collective literature and for the measurement of inequality within the household as
shown in the next section.
3 The curvature of the income scaling function and intra-household
inequality
The inequality in the distribution of household resources depends on the concavity
of m(p, d). As the concavity of m(p, d) increases due to a price change also the
level of inequality within the household increases. A variation in prices may affect the
allocation of resources and the well-being of each family member.
Let us assume that the income scaling function m : R++ × Rn → R++ is twice
continuously differentiable with respect to prices. Concavity in p of m(p, d) implies
that the Hessian matrix Hm is negative semidefinite vT Hmv ≤ 0,∀v ∈ Rs . Recall
the definitions of ultramodularity and supermodularity (Marinacci and Montrucchio
2005)
∂2m
∂pi∂p j
≥ 0, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤  and
∂2m
∂pi∂p j
≥ 0, for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ . (11)
Ultramodular and supermodular functions are used in social sciences to analyze how
one agent’s decision affect the incentives of others. In the present case, we may refer
to incentives of sharing household resources with other members of the household.
We can then recover an absolute and a relative inequality aversion measure analo-
gous to the risk aversion coefficient
ρai (m) = −
∂2m
∂p2i
∂m
∂pi
and ρri (m) = −
∂2m
∂pi∂p j
∂m
∂pi
. (12)
The inequality aversion coefficient ρ(m) describes the changes in the income scaling
function m(p, d) in response to a change in the price of one good ρai (m), or two goods
ρri (m).
One can see that if m is non-decreasing in pi and −m is also ultramodular with
respect to prices, then ρai (m) ≥ 0 and also ρri (m) ≥ 0, while if −m is supermodular,
then ρri (m) ≥ 0. If −m is neither ultra nor supermodular, then the kth individual price
change generates a relatively less unequal distribution of the resources.
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In general, the product of two (quasi-)concave functions is not (quasi-)concave.
However, as stated in Prékopa et al. (2011), the product of twouniformly quasi-concave
functions is quasi-concave. Two functions f1, f2, are said uniformly quasi-concave if
and only if
min { fi (x), fi (y)} = fi (x) or fi (y), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀x, y ∈ R. (13)
Therefore, if m and e∗k are uniformly quasi-concave, then ek is also quasi-concave, and
moreover it is concave if Proposition 8 holds. Note that if the scaling function m(p, d)
is not concave in p, m(p, d) can be transformed in a concave function. To this end,
we may use the class of concave transformable (or transconcave) functions (Avriel
et al. 1988) by adopting a one to one transformation of their domain. The function
m : A ⊆ R++ ×Rn → C ⊆ R++ is said to be G-concave if there exists a continuous
real-valued increasing function G defined on C such that G(m(p, d)) is concave over
A. Alternatively, letting G−1 denote the inverse of G,
m(αp1 + (1 − α)p2, d) ≥ G−1[αG(m(p1, d)) + (1 − α)G(m(p2, d))] (14)
holds ∀p1, p2 ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1].
To be concavifiable m(p, d) must be at least quasi-concave. We observe also that
in the twice continuously differentiable case, necessary and sufficient conditions lie
between the properties of pseudoconcavity and strong pseudoconcavity.10
Additional assumptions on G may be required to obtain a scaling function
G (m(p, d)) satisfying Propositions 4 and 5. If m is at least quasi-concave, and G
is any positive real-valued increasing function, then the composition G (m(p, d)) is
positive, homogeneous of degree 0, non-decreasing in prices and concave.
4 Example
The following example illustrates how to test the regularity conditions of the indi-
vidual expenditure function (sharing rule) derived in Propositions 4 (homogeneity), 5
(positive and non-decreasing in prices), 6 and 7 (concavity) of Sect. 2 and the aversion
coefficients introduced in Sect. 3.11 The example uses the estimates of the individual
expenditure ek obtained in Menon and Perali (2012), where a general collective con-
sumption specification as in Eq. (7) is estimated. Using the information of clothing
expenditures for adults and children, in Menon and Perali (2012) observed individual
income e∗k is scaled by the modifying function m(p, d) as in (7)
ek = e∗k m(p, d) with 0 < m(p, d) < ee∗k . (15)
10 To establish conditions under which a twice continuously differentiable function is transformable con-
cave for some transformation see Avriel et al. (1988). For results referring to functions not necessarily twice
differentiable see Crouzeix (1977).
11 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting to explain our results by means of an empirical
example.
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In Menon and Perali (2012) the function that scales individual income is specified as
a Cobb–Douglas
m(p, d) = 	i=1 p
φpi
i 	
n
j=1d
φs j
j , (16)
where j = 1, . . . , n indexes the exogenous factors d = {age ratio, education ratio}
with associated parameters φsi and i = 1, . . . ,  indexes the prices p ={adult clothing, children clothing} with associated parameters φpi . The estimated
parameters and associated variable means, the value of the resource share, income
scaling function, the sharing rule in level and proportion are reported in Table 1.
The average resource share ηk = 0.67 is obtained as the ratio between observed
individual expenditure e∗k and total household expenditure e. The predicted value of
the income scaling function m (p, d) is 0.726 and it satisfies the bounds of Eq. (7),
0 < m < 1.499. The function m (p, d) captures how assignable goods are allocated
within each household. In our case, the sharing rule in levels ek(p, uk, d) = e∗k m is
scaled down from about 1238 to about 899 Euros. On average the observed resource
share ηk is allocated about 2/3 to the parent and 1/3 to the child component, but the
share ek/e = 0.484 shows that parents actually keep for themselves almost 1/2 rather
than 2/3 of the household resources. As described in Propositions 4–7, if m (p, d) is
positive, non-decreasing in prices, homogeneous of degree 0 and concave, then ek is a
legitimate cost function. Table 2 shows the tests of these regularity properties. Given
the Cobb–Douglas form of m(p, d), the function is positive in its domain. Because
the gradient with respect to prices of the modifying function m(p, d)
∇m p =
⎡
⎣
m
φp1
p1
m
φp2
p2
⎤
⎦ (17)
is positive for each element, then the income scaling function is non-decreasing in
prices. The income scaling function estimated in Menon and Perali (2012) is not
homogeneous of degree zero because both price parameters are positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero. Imposing the homogeneity property (φp1 + φp2 = 0), the
function cannot be non-decreasing in each price. However, the expenditure function
is non-decreasing if the inequality in Eq. (10) is satisfied, that is, if φpi ≥ −
∂e∗k
∂pi
pi
e∗k
,
∀i .
Further, m(p, d) is concave if and only if vT Hmv ≤ 0 , where the Hessian matrix
Hm is as follows
Hm =
[
m1,1 m1,2
m2,1 m2,2
]
=
⎡
⎢
⎣
m
φp1 (φp1−1)
p21
m
φp1φp2
p1 p2
m
φp1φp2
p2 p1
m
φp2 (φp2−1)
p22
⎤
⎥
⎦ . (18)
As shown in Table 2, the Hessian matrix is negative definite. Note that if m is a Cobb–
Douglas function, then m is concave when φpi ≥ 0,∀i and the degree of homogeneity
is not greater than 1 as in our example. Also note that m cannot be both homogeneous
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Table 2 Test of the regularity conditions of the sharing rule and inequality aversion
Test Outcome
Homogeneity of degree zero φpa = −φpc Not homogeneous in p
Non decreasing in p ∇m p > 0 Non decreasing in p
Concavity in p Hm =
[ −0.1434 0.057
0.057 −2.9
]
Hm is negative definite
Aversion to inequality ρ(m) =
[
2.21 −0.877
−0.089 4.64
]
−m neither ultra nor supermodular
Tests and outcomes are based on the empirical analysis by Menon and Perali (2012)
of degree 0 and concave. Definitions in (13) and (14) guarantee the quasi-concavity
of the expenditure function even if m is not concave.
The income scaling function estimated in Menon and Perali (2012) is not homo-
geneous of degree 0 in prices. This implies that the individual expenditure function
is not homogeneous of degree 1. However, the income scaling function passes all
other regularity tests requiring m to be positive, non-decreasing in prices and concave.
In empirical applications homogeneity of degree 0 of the income scaling function
would have to be imposed to maintain the homogeneity of degree 1 of the individual
expenditure function and to guarantee that the function is at least quasi-concave by
Propositions 6 and 7.
From expressions in Eq. (12), the absolute and relative inequality aversion coeffi-
cients are
ρ(m) =
[
ρa1(m) ρr1(m)
ρr2(m) ρa2(m)
]
=
⎡
⎣
1−φp1
p1
−φp1p1
−φp2p2
1−φp2
p2
⎤
⎦ (19)
for φpi = 1 and φpi = 0, ∀i . Because−m is neither ultra nor supermodular, then both
prices of assignable goods generate a less unequal distribution of household resources.
The Hessian and inequality aversion matrices take the following values
Hm =
[−0.143 0.057
0.057 −2.9
]
and ρ(m) =
[
2.21 −0.877
−0.089 4.64
]
showing that m is more concave in the dimension that refers to the distribution of
resources towards children than towards adults because both the own derivative, in
absolute terms, and the absolute inequality aversion coefficient of the child are larger
than those of the adults, that is
∣
∣m2,2
∣
∣ >
∣
∣m1,1
∣
∣ and ρa2(m) > ρa1(m). If there are
disposable resources in the family, when the parents hold more and more resources for
themselves, they also distribute more to their children because m1,2 is a positive cross
derivative. Because ρr1(m) is in absolute terms greater than ρr2(m), the percentage
change in the marginal redistribution of resources towards the adults, when the price
of the children change, is greater than the percentage change in the redistribution of
resources towards the children, when the price of the adults change.
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5 Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature of collective household models by completing
Lewbel’s (1985) seminal work with the study of the properties of collective indi-
vidual expenditure functions necessary to be theoretically plausible after the scaling
modification of income. We show that the income scaling function must be positive,
non-decreasing, homogenous of degree zero and concave in prices.
The characterization of the collective class of individual expenditure functions pre-
sented here allows testing the regularity properties of the sharing rule as illustrated in
the example. We also examine the curvature properties of the income scaling function
to introduce newmeasures of inequality aversion describing how differently individual
price changes affect the distribution of household resources.
As a final recommendation, applications of collective models should verify the
regularity properties on a standardbasis so thatmore evidence canbegathered about the
behavioral structure of the sharing rule andwelfare analysis can be robustly performed.
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